Col. DOUGLAS MacGREGOR, (Ret.)
Douglas Macgregor is a retired Army colonel and a decorated Persian Gulf War combat veteran. He is the author of "Breaking the Phalanx" and "Transformation under Fire: Revolutionizing the Way America Fights". Macgregor served in the first Gulf War and at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 
Europe during the Kosovo Air Campaign. He was an adviser to the Department of Defense on initial Second Gulf War plans and is an expert on defense policy issues of organization and transformation.
I discovered his article posted in the Jingoist. I have severely parsed it to fit the purposes for which I am posting it here: to supplement an on going discussion in The Vigil.
Europe during the Kosovo Air Campaign. He was an adviser to the Department of Defense on initial Second Gulf War plans and is an expert on defense policy issues of organization and transformation.I discovered his article posted in the Jingoist. I have severely parsed it to fit the purposes for which I am posting it here: to supplement an on going discussion in The Vigil.
WASHINGTON'S WAR
The human and material cost of America's occupation of Iraq is reaching a climax. The ongoing "surge" of ground combat troops into Baghdad and its surroundings is producing higher U.S. casualties, exacerbating intersectarian violence and draining the last reserves of American patience.
Like the French Army in Algeria and the British Army in Ireland, the generals in Baghdad are discovering that soldiers and Marines in Iraq control only what they stand on, and when they no longer stand on it, they don't control it. Meanwhile, the Army grinds itself to pieces while the national military leadership stands by watching, clinging to the promise of more troops for a larger ground force in the future--a promise that is irrelevant to the challenge we now face: getting out of Iraq.
. . . .
The U.S. needs a new national military strategy, a strategy designed to enhance America's role as the world's engine of prosperity, making the American way of life attractive, not threatening, to others. . . . in the aftermath of Iraq, both policymakers and the flag officers who command our forces must reorient their thinking to a strategy that exalts economy of force in expeditionary operations and rejects plans to optimize the Army and Marine Corps for any more misguided occupations. . . . .
Soon after the terrorist attacks against New York City and the Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001, President Bush invoked the images of World War II, demanding total victory over a new, demonized enemy: Islamist terrorism. Those who were not with us in the new ideological struggle to democratize the Middle East were suddenly against us. When American forces intervened two years later in Iraq, they did so not in search of indigenous friends and allies in a country tyrannized for a generation, but in search of new enemies to destroy.
With the passage of time, politicians imbued military action to destroy Islamist terrorism with a meaning it never had, equating the unnecessary and destructive American military occupation of Muslim-Arab Iraq with America's special mission to spread freedom throughout the world. Worse, Iraq's forced democratization unleashed reactionary forces Americans did not anticipate. These forces strengthened Iranian regional power and influence, precipitating a dangerous anti-American backlash abroad and creating economic vulnerability at home. We cannot easily reverse the outcome in Iraq, but we can avoid repeating the pattern of behavior that made the Iraqi quagmire inevitable.
. . . . the kind of secular democracy the Bush administration sought to export to Iraq through military occupation is synonymous in most of the Muslim Arab world with massive corruption, widening gaps between rich and poor, and moral decadence as seen inside Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf emirates. Where democracy does prevail, Islamism tends to govern. And, where Islamism governs, as seen in Iran--a state that is, in practice, the most democratic in the Islamic world--democracy is subjugated to Islamic Shariah law. This outcome is hardly in the interest of U.S. national security.
. . . . Unwanted occupations should be avoided, not repeated. Many point to the British success in Malaya as a reason to persist in delusions of success in counterinsurgency in developing regions. However, there is a vast difference between a British Army in Malaya commanded by Sir Gerald Templar in 1952, whose publicly stated goal was to end British occupation of Malaya, and the open-ended American military occupation of Iraq that precipitated a popular Sunni Muslim-Arab revolt against an unwanted American military occupation. From the moment we occupied central Iraq with no plan to leave, we were at war with a population humiliated by our presence; it is the kind of conflict the American military should not be asked to fight.
If performing counterinsurgency campaigns against enemies created by the overbearing presence of U.S. ground forces is not the strategic purpose for which U.S. forces should fight, then what is the purpose? As they begin to contemplate the use of American military power after Iraq, policymakers should consider the following points:
First, interventions to remove genuine threats to U.S. and allied security interests should not involve U.S. military occupations that have no chance of altering cultures, societies or peoples fundamentally different from us. America cannot financially sustain open-ended military interventions in failing or failed societies with the object of imposing cultural change through military occupation to convert developing societies' social, political and economic structures into modern Western institutions. Not only do these operations involve expensive, long-term military garrisons on foreign territory, but the probability of success for these interventions, as seen throughout most of the
20th century, is very, very low.
Like the French Army in Algeria and the British Army in Ireland, the generals in Baghdad are discovering that soldiers and Marines in Iraq control only what they stand on, and when they no longer stand on it, they don't control it. Meanwhile, the Army grinds itself to pieces while the national military leadership stands by watching, clinging to the promise of more troops for a larger ground force in the future--a promise that is irrelevant to the challenge we now face: getting out of Iraq.
. . . .
The U.S. needs a new national military strategy, a strategy designed to enhance America's role as the world's engine of prosperity, making the American way of life attractive, not threatening, to others. . . . in the aftermath of Iraq, both policymakers and the flag officers who command our forces must reorient their thinking to a strategy that exalts economy of force in expeditionary operations and rejects plans to optimize the Army and Marine Corps for any more misguided occupations. . . . .
Soon after the terrorist attacks against New York City and the Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001, President Bush invoked the images of World War II, demanding total victory over a new, demonized enemy: Islamist terrorism. Those who were not with us in the new ideological struggle to democratize the Middle East were suddenly against us. When American forces intervened two years later in Iraq, they did so not in search of indigenous friends and allies in a country tyrannized for a generation, but in search of new enemies to destroy.
With the passage of time, politicians imbued military action to destroy Islamist terrorism with a meaning it never had, equating the unnecessary and destructive American military occupation of Muslim-Arab Iraq with America's special mission to spread freedom throughout the world. Worse, Iraq's forced democratization unleashed reactionary forces Americans did not anticipate. These forces strengthened Iranian regional power and influence, precipitating a dangerous anti-American backlash abroad and creating economic vulnerability at home. We cannot easily reverse the outcome in Iraq, but we can avoid repeating the pattern of behavior that made the Iraqi quagmire inevitable.
. . . . the kind of secular democracy the Bush administration sought to export to Iraq through military occupation is synonymous in most of the Muslim Arab world with massive corruption, widening gaps between rich and poor, and moral decadence as seen inside Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf emirates. Where democracy does prevail, Islamism tends to govern. And, where Islamism governs, as seen in Iran--a state that is, in practice, the most democratic in the Islamic world--democracy is subjugated to Islamic Shariah law. This outcome is hardly in the interest of U.S. national security.
Avoiding Occupation
. . . . Unwanted occupations should be avoided, not repeated. Many point to the British success in Malaya as a reason to persist in delusions of success in counterinsurgency in developing regions. However, there is a vast difference between a British Army in Malaya commanded by Sir Gerald Templar in 1952, whose publicly stated goal was to end British occupation of Malaya, and the open-ended American military occupation of Iraq that precipitated a popular Sunni Muslim-Arab revolt against an unwanted American military occupation. From the moment we occupied central Iraq with no plan to leave, we were at war with a population humiliated by our presence; it is the kind of conflict the American military should not be asked to fight.
If performing counterinsurgency campaigns against enemies created by the overbearing presence of U.S. ground forces is not the strategic purpose for which U.S. forces should fight, then what is the purpose? As they begin to contemplate the use of American military power after Iraq, policymakers should consider the following points:
First, interventions to remove genuine threats to U.S. and allied security interests should not involve U.S. military occupations that have no chance of altering cultures, societies or peoples fundamentally different from us. America cannot financially sustain open-ended military interventions in failing or failed societies with the object of imposing cultural change through military occupation to convert developing societies' social, political and economic structures into modern Western institutions. Not only do these operations involve expensive, long-term military garrisons on foreign territory, but the probability of success for these interventions, as seen throughout most of the
20th century, is very, very low.Col. Macgregor here discusses some global geopolitical-strategic considerations, offers insights into civilian-military relations, and deals at length with military modernization. Then he returns to the occupation in Iraq:
Circling The Wagons
If we do not abandon the current strategy of intervention, destruction and occupation to spread democracy, America will end up like the circled wagon trains of the Old West--surrounded by hostile Indian tribes, but with no U.S. cavalry riding to the rescue, because they're also behind the wagons. Fortunately, there is another way.
. . . .
In warfare, as in wrestling, the attempt to throw the opponent without first weakening his foothold and upsetting his balance results in self-exhaustion. Without a coherent military strategy or attainable political objectives beyond the vague desire to transform non-European societies and cultures into replicas of English-speaking democracy, American ground forces will fall into the trap of brutal raids, patrols and checkpoints, forgetting that no local government can be legitimate and tolerate foreign occupation for long.
. . . .
With the right senior officers and selection system in place, and civilian leadership able to distinguish careerism from professionalism and willing to punish the former and reward the latter, the next president can resolutely implement a new military strategy. Most important, doing what every presidential administration has done since 1945--going to war with the senior leadership and the force they found on taking office--is no longer an option. If the next administration repeats this mistake, as did the Johnson and the Bush administrations, we will continue to muddle through trying to buy everything and win nothing. . . .
. . . .
In warfare, as in wrestling, the attempt to throw the opponent without first weakening his foothold and upsetting his balance results in self-exhaustion. Without a coherent military strategy or attainable political objectives beyond the vague desire to transform non-European societies and cultures into replicas of English-speaking democracy, American ground forces will fall into the trap of brutal raids, patrols and checkpoints, forgetting that no local government can be legitimate and tolerate foreign occupation for long.
. . . .
With the right senior officers and selection system in place, and civilian leadership able to distinguish careerism from professionalism and willing to punish the former and reward the latter, the next president can resolutely implement a new military strategy. Most important, doing what every presidential administration has done since 1945--going to war with the senior leadership and the force they found on taking office--is no longer an option. If the next administration repeats this mistake, as did the Johnson and the Bush administrations, we will continue to muddle through trying to buy everything and win nothing. . . .
posted by Vigilante at 9:52 PM
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